16. On Courts:Allowing Courts to Close Down to Safeguard Fairness and Justice

The value of courts lies in safeguarding fairness and justice in society. At all times, society inevitably faces various disputes, necessitating courts to resolve them. Courts also serve as the final arbiters of such disputes, and their rulings must align with fairness and justice. This is an inherent requirement of democracy. In other words, the mission of courts is to deliver fairness and justice to society. If courts fail to fulfill this mission, then their existence becomes unnecessary.

The adjudicative power of courts fundamentally derives from public recognition. From a legal logic perspective, while it may appear that law grants courts this authority, law itself embodies the will of the people, and its efficacy stems from widespread public acceptance. Thus, the adjudicative power conferred by law is, at its core, the adjudicative power recognized by the people. In legal practice, courts can only genuinely exercise adjudicative power if citizens broadly recognize them and willingly submit disputes for resolution. If citizens generally lack such recognition and prefer alternative dispute resolution methods over court proceedings, courts will lack cases to hear—and without cases, adjudication becomes impossible. This demonstrates that judicial power fundamentally originates from citizen recognition, a principle fully consistent with the foundational logic that all state power belongs to the people.

Since judicial power originates from citizens' recognition, citizens possess the right to choose courts they trust for litigation. The specific court selected remains the plaintiff's prerogative. In principle, citizens may choose any court within the nation. To enable citizens to genuinely exercise this right of court selection, existing jurisdictional rules in national laws must be dismantled.

Jurisdiction rules classify legal disputes and mandate that certain types of cases must be filed in specific courts or a limited number of courts, with other courts lacking authority to hear them. For example, a contract dispute must be filed either in the court where the defendant resides or in the court where the contract was performed; no other court has jurisdiction. This system results in strict limitations on which courts can hear cases, denying citizens the right to choose a court based on their own will. Such jurisdictional rules are a major cause of judicial corruption.

Allowing citizens to choose their court would eliminate judicial corruption. Suppose Party A intends to sue Party B. As the plaintiff, Party A will naturally select a court that favors their position. From Party A's perspective, the chosen court would fall into one of two categories: The first is a fair and impartial court. The second is a court where Party A has connections that could influence the outcome. If the first option is chosen, the dispute will naturally receive a fair adjudication. If the second option is chosen, although the first-instance ruling may be unfair and disadvantageous to Party B, Party B retains the right to appeal to a second-instance court. Party B, like Party A, must either select a fair and impartial court or one where they possess connections. Because Party B retains the option to choose the appellate court, this choice compels Party A to favor a fair and impartial court when selecting the trial court. If the case proceeds to a third instance, the right to choose that court similarly pressures the party selecting the appellate court to favor fairness and impartiality.

Furthermore, citizens may not only select courts but also choose the judge presiding over their case. After the plaintiff selects a court, the defendant gains the right to choose a specific judge within that court. Thus, even if the plaintiff selects a court favorable to them, they cannot guarantee the presiding judge will be equally favorable. This compels both plaintiff and defendant to select only courts and judges committed to upholding fairness and justice.

By safeguarding citizens' rights to choose courts and judges, judicial corruption can be effectively eradicated.

Once citizens freely select courts, some courts will inevitably see increased caseloads while others experience declines. Courts with rising caseloads will be those upholding judicial integrity and delivering fairness to society; those with declining caseloads will be courts lacking public trust and plagued by judicial corruption. To weed out corrupt courts, we must incentivize those upholding fairness and justice. The method is straightforward: increase court revenues, thereby raising judges' incomes. All case filing fees collected by courts should be retained entirely by the courts themselves. Beyond basic state funding, courts' primary income should derive from these fees. Thus, courts handling more cases earn higher revenues, leading to better compensation for their judges. Higher judge incomes directly reflect excellence, as outstanding judges are selected more frequently by litigants. More selections mean handling more cases, which inevitably leads to greater income. Thus, excellent judges are inherently high earners—good judges should drive luxury cars and live in mansions.

Courts with low caseloads and meager revenues typically harbor judicial corruption and fail to deliver fairness and justice to society. Such courts should be permitted to close. Conversely, courts that uphold fairness and justice through substantial caseloads should be authorized to establish branch courts. This approach will gradually eliminate all corrupt courts and judges, ensuring courts exclusively serve society with fairness and justice.

When courts can eradicate corruption and deliver fairness and justice to society through their rulings, they have completed the first step in establishing judicial authority. To truly establish judicial authority, it is also essential that once a court issues a ruling, it must be enforced. In summary, the judicial authority of courts stems from two aspects: first, that the rulings conform to fairness and justice; second, that the rulings are inevitably enforced. Both are indispensable.

In practice, court cases fall into three categories: criminal offenses, administrative litigation, and civil disputes. For the first two types, rulings are generally enforced effectively. Civil disputes, however, often prove difficult to enforce—particularly debt cases requiring monetary payments from defendants.

Many assume that when defendants genuinely wish to repay but lack funds, ensuring every judgment is enforced is inherently impossible. This perspective overlooks a crucial point: money fundamentally represents human labor. As long as a defendant is capable of working, they can generate assets and fulfill the judgment. Following this logic, one might consider offsetting debts through labor. However, defendants may not willingly agree to this. Hence, the court must impose compulsory labor. Once compulsory labor is enforced, the defendant's personal freedom is restricted. Therefore, compulsory labor not only executes the judgment through labor earnings but also through the restriction of personal liberty. Consequently, the debt cannot be offset solely by the defendant's labor earnings; the restricted freedom must also be factored into the offset.

Compulsory labor refers to the court's transfer of defendants unable to fulfill judgments to designated factories for forced labor upon plaintiff's request. During this period, personal freedom is restricted, and defendants may not leave the factory premises except on statutory rest days. By subjecting defendants to compulsory labor, both their freedom and labor compensation are used to offset debts. The offset mechanism is as follows: one day of compulsory labor offsets five days of the average social income (specific ratios adjusted based on actual circumstances). For example, if the national average daily income is 200 yuan, one day of forced labor offsets 1,000 yuan. During forced labor, wages follow the principle of equal pay for equal work. After deducting the defendant's basic living expenses, the remaining portion of their wages is prioritized for covering enforcement costs, with the remainder paid to the plaintiff.

Once the defendant undergoes compulsory labor within the stipulated timeframe, and their freedom and labor compensation offset the plaintiff's claim, the defendant's debt is deemed executed and extinguished. The judgment is then considered fully executed. This method ensures all debt-related judgments are enforced.

Naturally, whether to impose compulsory labor on the defendant depends on the plaintiff's request; the court has absolutely no authority to initiate compulsory labor against the defendant on its own initiative.

For defendants who wish to repay but lack immediate means, plaintiffs may not demand forced labor; for those capable of repayment yet maliciously evading debt, plaintiffs should typically request forced labor. This plaintiff-driven choice safeguards judgment enforcement, upholds judicial authority, and maximally curbs dishonest conduct.

In essence, when judicial authority is established in a democratic nation, a social integrity system follows suit.